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SUBCHAPTER S AND SUBCHAPTER C

the vagrancy statute. This will
difficulties to a large degree.
(4) Since many municipalities
probably unconstitutional, action
abolish vagrancy laws throughout

minimize or eliminate constitutional
still have vagrancy provisions that are
should be taken by the legislature to
the state.

If these recommendations are followed, an answer may yet be imminent
to Justice Douglas's query: "How can we hold our heads high and still confuse with crime the need for welfare or the need for work?" 245
WILLIAM

F.

WILLIAM

E. WILLIAMS
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INTERRELATIONSHIP OF SUBCHAPTER S AND
SUBCHAPTER C*
The ratification of the sixteenth amendment to the United States Constitution in 1918 injected a new consideration into all business relations. In
more recent years, with tax rates on individuals and corporations climbing to
alltime highs, careful examination of the tax ramifications of every commercial transaction has become indispensable. "Lest the tail wag the dog,"
Congress made an attempt to neutralize to some extent the tax aspects of
business planning by the passage of Subchapter S in 1958. Under Subchapter
S,a corporation meeting the standards of section 1371 is extended an opportunity to elect to be treated as a "modified" corporation, with income subjected in most instances to only one tax at the shareholder level.
Subchapter S corporations have been incorrectly referred to as corporations taxed as partnerships. A Subchapter S (or tax option) corporation is a
corporation and is governed by the provisions of Subchapter C (taxation of
corporations) unless inconsistent with specific sections of Subchapter S. It is
wholly independent of Subchapter K (taxation of partnerships) although
the 1969 tax reform proposal of the Nixon administration would have altered
the mechanics of Subchapter S as they presently exist and brought them more
into line with Subchapter K.
The object of this note is to explore the relationship between Subchapter
S and Subchapter C, as well as other miscellaneous corporate provisions, and
to analyze the similarities and dissimilarities between the two. No attempt is
made to explain or define the mechanics involved except insofar as to show
any relationships that might exist.
245. Douglas, supra note 226, at 12.
*The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Professor J. J. Freeland and the
use of the outline he prepared for delivery at the University of Iowa.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1970

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1970], Art. 5
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXII

CORPORATE FORMATION

According to the Regulations, other provisions of the Code not inconsistent with the provisions of Subchapter S "will apply with respect to both
the electing small business corporation and its shareholders in the same
manner that they would apply had no election been made." 1 Therefore, a
corporation that elects Subchapter S is eligible for nonrecognition of gain
upon the transfer of property to a corporation controlled by the transferor
under section 351. However, both newly formed and already existing corporations should insure that they meet the requirements set out in section
1371 (a) for an S election. Of special interest to the newly formed corporation
are the Commissioner's requirements of corporate existence 2 and strict com8
pliance with the Regulations.
What Constitutes Stock?
To be eligible for nonrecognition under section 351 the transferors must
be in control of the corporation immediately after the transfer4 and the
transfer must be solely in exchange for stock and securities of the transferee
corporation.5 This is an area of special concern for the Subchapter S corporation since it is allowed only one class of stock.6 The Commissioner has
closely scrutinized the second class of stock area in dealing with purported
debt obligations received by the shareholders on formation, which appear
to be securities or some other form of equity investment. Prior to the 1966
amendment the regulations7 stated that "if an instrument purporting to be
a debt obligation is actually stock, it woill constitute a second class of stock."
However, no court explicitly accepted the Commissioner's argument. In the
first three cases in this area the courts ignored the Regulations and reached
their decisions on independent grounds. 9 In Catalina Homes,1° the Tax Court
stated that the substance of the transaction would determine whether the
instrument is what it purports to be in form. Among the various criteria
considered by the court in determining whether the obligation was a true
debt were:
(1) presence or absence of a maturity date,
(2) right of the creditor to enforce the payment of the principal and
interest,
1. Treas. Reg. §1.1372-1 (c)(1959).

2. Homer W. Forrester, 49 T.C. 499 (1968); William Pestcoe, 40 T.C. 195 (1963). In
both cases the court found that the election had not been timely filed.
3. Treas. Reg. §1.1372-3 (a) (1959).
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §368 (c) [hereinafter cited as CODF].
5. CODE §351; Treas. Reg. §1.351-1 (1955).

6. CODE §1371 (a)
(1),
(4).
7. Treas. Reg.§1.1371-1 (g)(1959).
8. Id. (emphasis added).

9. Henderson v.United States, 245 F.Supp. 782 (M.D.Ala. 1965); Seven Sixty Ranch,
66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. §9293 (D.C. Wyo. 1966); Catalina Homes, CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1361
(1964).

10. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1361 (1964).
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(3) participation in management,
(4) whether the creditor subordinates his debts to those of other
corporate creditors,
(5) whether the corporation is adequately capitalized,
(6) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder,
(7) whether the advance was made at the time of the organization of
the corporation, and
(8) the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside sources.
The court there found that these criteria were not fulfilled and that the shareholders' open account advances, which were in fact preferred over their nopar common stock, constituted a second class of stock.
In Henderson v. United States, 1 the district court quoted with approval
from United States v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.' 2 the distinction between
a stockholder and a creditor: 3
The essential difference between a stockholder and a creditor is that
the stockholder's intention is to embark upon the corporate adventure
taking the risks of loss attendant upon it, so that he may enjoy the
chances of profit. The creditor, on the other hand, does not intend to
take such risks so far as they may be avoided, but merely to lend his
capital to others who do intend to take them.
After examining the equity capital versus indebtedness criteria, the court
found without further discussion that Henderson's advances constituted a second class of stock. In Seven Sixty Ranch Co.,' 4 the district court found that
true debt existed, and that therefore the notes in question did not constitute
a second class of stock.
In 1966 the Tax Court faced the question of the validity of this regulation 5 in the case of W. C. Gamman.'6 The court found that the Commissioner had in effect applied a "meat ax" in requiring that all instruments
purporting to be debt obligations, but in fact representing equity capital,
should be held to be a second class of stock. The court held that this was
beyond the scope of the statute and beyond the intent of Congress in enacting Subchapter S, the intent of Congress being "to permit businesses to
select the form of business organization desired, without the necessity of
taking into account the major differences in tax consequences."' 17 In light of
the provision in section 1376 for the adjustment of the shareholder's basis
in any indebtedness owed to him by the electing corporation by the shareholder's prorata share of the corporation's net operating losses (NOL), the

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

245 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
133 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1943).
Id. at 993.
66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 29293 (D.C. Wyo. 1966).
Treas. Reg. §1.1371-1 (g) (1959).
46 T.C. 1 (1966).
Id. at 7.
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court decided that there could be valid debts or equity contribution without
necessarily creating a second class of stock. The court found that in determining the character of the instruments by reference to the substance of
the underlying transaction, the Treasury should also look to the economic realities to determine whether the instruments, even though they might
represent equity capital, actually gave the holders any rights or interests in
the corporation different from those owned by themselves as the holders of
the nominal stock.' Noting that the advances in question were made in
direct proportion to their stockholding and that the notes gave no preference
over creditors, the court held that "whatever preferences the notes gave [the
stockholders] . . . in the income and assets of the corporation, if enforced,

were preferences only over themselves as stockholders."' 19 The court accordingly concluded that though the notes did not constitute indebtedness, they
were not a second class of stock, but were instead capital contributions of
the same character as the stock already held in the corporation.
Although a majority of the judges in Gamman did not think it was
necessary to question the validity of the regulation, the Commissioner has
20
since amended the Regulations to read:
Obligations which purport to represent debt but which actually represent equity capital will generally constitute a second class of stock.
However, if such purported debt obligations are owned solely by the
owners of the nominal stock of the corporation in substantially the
same proportion as they own such nominal stock, such purported
debt obligations will be treated as contributions to capital rather than
a second class of stock.
In the cases decided since this amendment, the courts have indicated that
although proportionality is the key factor, its absence may be overcome by
special circumstances.21

In Milton T. Raynor,2 2 shareholder advances could not be made proportionately, but the shareholders agreed among themselves to share the
burdens and benefits of the corporation in proportion to their shareholding.
The court held this agreement sufficient to overcome the disproportionality

18.

Id. at 9.

19. Id. at 9.
20. Treas. Reg. §1.1371-1 (g) (1966) (emphasis added).
21.

Brennan v. O'Donnell, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 29314 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (the court did

not discuss proportionality, but merely said that looking to the realities of the situation
(the advances were evidenced only by entries on the ledger sheets of the corporation)
the obligations were not a second class of stock); August F. Nielsen Co., 27 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 44 (1968) (the court found special circumstances indicating that although there had
been a shift in the proportionality of the holding of the nominal stock and the purported
debt, the amounts ultimately received by either party would be the same); Lewis Bldg.
& Supply, Inc., 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 844 (1966) (the court found that amounts contributed were equity capital, but that there was proportionality and the shareholders did
not receive any interests different from those due them as shareholders).
22.

50 T.C. 762 (1968).
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and to meet the test of regulation 1.1371-1 (g). Another way of avoiding
the second class of stock pitfall is to have the Subchapter S corporation issue
options, warrants, or convertible debentures to some individuals instead of
stock. The Service has ruled 23 that these will not constitute a second class
of stock as long as they have none of the attributes of immediate stock ownership, such as the right to receive dividends or to vote. The selective use of
options, warrants, or convertible debentures as a tool in tax planning permits
shareholders to direct the flow of corporate income and net operating losses
to designated individuals.
In considering "thin capitalization" 24 arguments, the Gamman court
stated it had some doubt as to its applicability as a factor in determining
the existence of a second class of stock for the purposes of Subchapter S.25
This doctrine has been established by the courts to prevent the avoidance of
the double tax in the normal corporate situation by a corporate distribution
of earnings to the shareholders in the form of interest or repayment of
their loans instead of in the form of dividends. In light of this purpose its
relevance to the Subchapter S area is tenuous at best, 'since the overriding
intent of Subchapter S is to eliminate double taxation by taxing all amounts
directly to the shareholders whether or not distributed. However, this procedure apparently may still be used to avoid even the single tax at the shareholder level by passing funds out as a repayment of shareholder loans.
On a completely "tax free" exchange under section 351 (a) the shareholders take a substituted basis for the stock and securities received from
the corporation, 2r and the corporation takes a transferred basis in the assets
received from the shareholders on the exchange. 27 However, in dealing with
a Subchapter S corporation there seems to be a preference for the use of
the "boot" provisions of section 351 (b). Under this provision the shareholders
recognize any gain they had on the transfer to the extent of the boot2s
received on the exchange. At the corporate level this gain recognition will
give rise to a stepped-up basis2 9 of the assets for purposes of depreciation and
determination of gain or loss on a later sale by the corporation. Also, by the
selective use of short-term notes"9 or installment obligations-' on formation,
the corporation can deflect income to identifiable shareholders through the
use of interest payments.

23.

Rev. Rul. 67-269, 1962-2 Ct.BULL. 298.

24. E.g., Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956).
25. 46 T.C. 1, 12 (1966).
26. CODE §358 (a).
27. CODE §362 (a).
28. CODE §351 (b) (1) (A), (B) (the amount of money plus the fair market value of any
other property received).
29. CODE §362 (a).
30. Short-term notes are considered to be other property and take a fair market value
under CODE §358 (a) (2).
31. Installment obligations are not considered to be a security for purposes of CODE
§351, Warren H. Brown, 27 T.C. 27 (1956),
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Net OperatingLosses
At the shareholder level the stepped-up stock basis3 2 is particularly beneficial because the allowance of net operating loss deductions 33 is keyed to
the shareholder's basis in the stock and debt obligations of the corporation.
In light of this limitation, consideration should be given to the factors that
determine the basis of the shareholder's stock and the existence of a valid
debt relationship between the shareholders and the corporation. Since Subchapter S does not specifically define "adjusted basis," the Tax Court has
said that the general code provisions on basis should apply.34 In Byrne v.
Commissioner,35 the taxpayer claimed that the basis of his stock was its fair
market value on the effective date of the Subchapter S election. The Commissioner, on the other hand, asserted that the true basis was the original
cost to the taxpayer increased by any contributions he had made to the
corporation's capital. In determining the taxpayer's stock basis the court
agreed with the Commissioner and held that retained earnings did not
constitute contributions to capital for basis purposes.
In Plowden v. Commissioner36 the taxpayer contended that the limitation of section 1374 (c) should be read together with section 172, thereby
making the full corporate loss available to the shareholders even when the
loss exceeds the basis of the shareholder's investment in the corporation.
However, the court found that the wording of section 172 (h) 37 prohibited this
interpretation. Under the language of the statute the loss could confer no
benefit beyond the basis of the shareholders' stock since the loss belonged to
the corporation and not to the shareholders individually. It therefore seems
that the basis of a shareholder's stock in a Subchapter S Corporation is its
cost to him, regardless of its fair market value at the date of election, with
proper adjustments for contributions to capital, constructive distributions of
UTI,3 1 and the pass-through of corporate net operating losses. 39
Besides the criteria set out earlier for determining the existence of a
true debtor-creditor relationship, further consideration must be given to
ascertain whether the obligation runs from the corporation to the shareholders. This determination is particularly crucial for the purpose of ascertaining the proper net operating loss deduction allowable to the shareholders.
The fact that the shareholders may be primarily liable on the indebtedness
of the corporation to third parties does not necessarily mean that this is a
debt of the corporation running to the shareholders. The courts have held
32. CODE §§351 (b)-358 (a).
33. CODE §1374 (c) (2).
34. Joe E. Borg, 50 T.C. 257 (1968).
35. 361 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1966).
36. 48 T.G. 666 (1967), afJ'd, 398 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1968).

37. CODE §172(h) states that there shall be disregarded for the purposes of subsection
(a) "the net operating loss for such corporation for any taxable year for which such corporation is an electing small business corporation .... "
38. CODE § 1376 (a) (undistributed taxable income).
39. Joe E. Borg, 50 T.C. 257 (1968); Milton T. Raynor, 50 T.C. 762 (1968); William
H. Leonhart, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 443 (1968); CODE §1376 (b).
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that no form of indirect borrowing, be it guarantee, surety, accommodation,
co-making or otherwise, gives rise to indebtedness from the shareholders until
and unless the shareholders assume part or all of the obligation. 40 Prior to

that crucial time liability may exist, but it is not a debt to the shareholders,
and only those amounts directly traceable to lendings by the individual
shareholders constitute indebtedness of the corporation for the purposes of
net operating loss pass-through.4 ' The Service has recently ruled that for the
purpose of the net operating loss pass-through, debts owed a corporation are
not indebtedness to the shareholders even though the shareholders own a
42
majority interest in the corporation.
Upon repayment of these debts, amounts received by the creditor-shareholders are treated as a return of capital rather than a dividend. Where, as
a result of the reduction under section 1376 (b) (2), the basis of the indebtedness is exceeded by its face value, then a portion of the payments received
will be considered income and the remainder a return of capital. The portion
is determined by multiplying the amount received by a fraction, the numerator of which is the difference between the face amount and the basis of the
debt, and the denominator of which is the face amount of the debt. 43 In

Joe M. Smith, 4 the taxpayer contended that this general rule did not apply
because the indebtedness in question was not evidenced by a note or other
writing, but was merely held on the open accounts of the corporation. The
court held that the general rule was not predicated on the presence or absence
of evidence of the debt. The court also held that because of the lack of any
evidence of the indebtedness, the taxpayer could not take advantage of section 1232, and therefore all the income would be considered as generated by
a discount on an open account, thus giving rise to ordinary income. If there
had been evidence of the indebtedness, section 1232 would have treated the
amounts received in retirement of the bonds as received in exchange therefor.
Since the bonds would be considered capital assets in the creditor-shareholder's hands, the income would be taxed at capital gains rates. 45 A problem
peculiar to the S corporation is that once the basis of the indebtedness has
been reduced to zero it will never be increased by any constructive undistributed taxable income (UTI) distributions.46 Under Subchapter S,only the
shareholder's stock basis is increased by these distributionsY However, even
this problem has aspects beneficial to the shareholders because it permits
exchanging net operating losses for capital gains. Once the basis of the
debts has been reduced to zero through the NOL pass-through, payments
40. Joe E. Borg, 50 T.C. 257 (1968).
41. Byrne v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1966); Joe E. Borg, 50 T.C. 257 (1968);
William H. Perry, 47 T.C. 159 (1966), aft'd, 392 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1968); Haywood P.
Marton, 38 T.C. 188 (1962); William H. Leonhart, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 443 (1968).
42. Rev. Rul. 69-125, 1969 INT. REV. BULL. No. 12.
43. Darby Inv. Corp., 37 T.C. 839 (1962), aff'd, 315 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1963).
44. 48 T.C. 872 (1967).
45. Baker Commodities, Inc., 48 T.C. 374 (1967); Rev. Rul. 64-162, 1964-1 CUM. BULL.
304.
46. CODE §1373 (b).
47.

COD- §1376 (a).
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received in retirement of the bonds would still be capital gains under section
1232 (provided there is evidence of the debt).
What ConstitutesProperty?
Determining what is property on corporate formation is a problem that
is common to all corporations, but one deserving special consideration in
the newly born Subchapter S corporation. Where the prior business involved
the performance of services by the various partners or individuals a question
may arise on formation as to whether part of the stock was received in
exchange for prior services. 48 In United States v. Frazelllq the taxpayer had
rendered services to a partnership that dissolved and later incorporated with
the taxpayer receiving thirteen per cent of the stock. The Commissioner
claimed that the stock was received partly in exchange for services, that
section 351 (a) did not apply, and that the taxpayer should recognize the
value of the services as gross income under section 61 (a). The court agreed,
stating that no matter what the realities of the transaction, the taxpayer
would have to recognize the consideration he received in exchange for his
services:
(I) if the taxpayer's partnership interest had become possessory upon
the termination of the partnership, then to the extent the interest was received as compensation for service, it was taxable under regulation 1.7211 (b) (1) and then the transfer could be made tax-free under section 351(a):
(2) if the stock was a substitute for the original partnership interest,
then as much of the stock as was exchanged for services was gross income
and section 351 (a) does not apply.
In determining whether services rendered in connection with a transfer of
property will affect the tax-free nature of the transaction, consideration must
be given to whether the services are merely ancillary and subsidiary to the
property transfer. The Service has ruled that this is a fact question to be
determined on a case-by-case basis5 0
Assignment of Income
Assignment of income possibilities on the formation of an S corporation
is another area that deserves attention. Under regulation 1.453-9 (c) (2) the
transfer of installment sales obligations to a corporation can be brought within the protection of section 351 (a). This seems to be a classic example of
assignment of income since the transferor-shareholder has done all he is required to do on the original transaction and retains merely the naked right
to receive the deferred gain. When he transfers the obligations to the corporation he has realized the value of the future installments by the receipt of

48.
49.
50.

In such a case the transaction would be wholly under §351.
335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965).
Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 Cut. BULL. 133.
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stock equal to the fair market value of the obligations. If gain were recognized to the transferor-shareholder, the corporation would receive a steppedup basis in the obligations equal to the gain recognized, and the receipt of
future installments would be treated wholly as a return of basis. This situation seems dearly to fall within the holding of Commissioner v. P. G. Lake,
Inc.r1 that if an otherwise nonrecognition-type exchange under section
112 (b) (5) of the 1939 Code (now section 351 (a)) also amounts to an anticipatory assignment of income, such income would be taxable notwithstanding
the fact that it arises from a nonrecognition type of transfer. The Fifth Cir52
cuit, in Jack Ammann Photogrammetic Engineers, Inc. v. Commissioner,
stated that it would have found this argument persuasive as to the taxability
of gain realized on a transfer of installment obligations to a corporation under
section 351 had the question of the shareholder's taxability been before the
court.
The potential of assignment of income through midstream incorporation of going concerns is particularly attractive to the S area with its attendant
possibilities of income splitting among family members and close associates.
Relying on cases such as Lucas v. Earl53 and Helvering v. Horst,54 the Commissioner has here also overridden the nonrecognition provisions of section 351
and taxed the shareholders who have merely exchanged income rights for
their stock.5 5 The potential foi shifting income from bonds, stocks, rental
properties, et cetera is curtailed by the requirement of section 1372 (e) (5)
that no more than twenty per cent of the "gross receipts" of the corporation
can be derived from securities, rent, royalties, and the like. This seems to
limit the election of Subchapter S to corporations engaged in an active trade
or business. The strict election requirements- 6 and the capital gains limitation 57 have also combined to negate the one-shot election of Subchapter S
to pass through and disburse capital gains. Also, the fact that the election
must be made in the first month of the corporation's taxable year and will
continue until terminated, together with the provision that once terminated
a Subchapter S election cannot be remade for five years, serves to foreclose
the possibility of delaying the election until the relative levels of individual
and corporate income are known. 58
In making the Subchapter S election, care must also be taken that the
59
corporation is in existence at the time of the election. In J. William Frentz,
51. 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
52. 341 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1965) (dictum).
53. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
54. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
55. Commissioner v. Fender Sales, Inc., 38 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964) (taxpayer cancelled his claim for unpaid salary against a controlled corporation in exchange for its
stock); Adolph Weinberg, 44 T.C. 233 (1965) (taxpayer transferred growing crops shortly
before they were to be harvested).
56. CoDE §1372 (c).
57. CODE §1378, as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, §511 (c) (4).
58. Note, Assignment of Income: Possibilities Under Subschapter S,23 TAx L. REv.
213 (1968).
59. 44 T.C. 485 (1965), aff'd, 875 F.2d 662 (6th Cir. 1967).
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the corporation was held not to have been in existence on the date of the
election, and therefore the election was held ineffective. The taxpayer argued
that there was a de facto corporation, but the court held that this would be
the case only if there had been an attempt to perfect an organization under
state law. In this case, the court found no evidence of such attempt until the
articles of incorporation were filed, which occurred after the purported
election.
Another aspect of corporate existence to be examined is whether the
corporation is actually carrying on a trade or business. The expense deductions"s will be allowed only if the taxpayer is carrying on a trade or business.
This is important in the S area because of the attractiveness of incorporating
a hobby without incurring an additional corporate tax. In making this
factual determination the courts have considered the following evidentiary
criteria: whether the taxpayer's intention was to engage in the venture
for profit or merely for pleasure- and whether the profit motive was the
"dominant hope" of the taxpayer. 62 In considering the taxpayer's profit
motive the courts have held that the expectation need not even be a reasonable one.6 3 Though the prospect of eventual profits does have a bearing
on the taxpayer's good faith, a good faith expectation of making a profit is
all that is required.64 The business will be considered to be a valid and active
one even though the taxpayer derives pleasure therefrom, and the mere fact
that the business was previously carried on as a hobby will not preclude a
finding that it is a trade or business.65
Voting Trusts

Another problem peculiar to Subchapter S is the denial or the use of
the voting trust, because it supposedly constitutes either a second class of
stock 66 or an ineligible stockholder.6 7 In taking this tack the Commissioner
seems to be allowing the form rather than the substance of the situation to
control. The purpose of the S election is allow the businessman to select
the form he desires, be it proprietorship, partnership, or corporation, without
the necessity of taking into account the major differences in tax consequences.68 The apparent aim of the shareholder and class of stock requirements is to limit the size of the corporation and thereby the problems of
income allocation. In considering the voting requirements of regulation
60.

61.
62.

§ §161-175.
Tatt v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1948).
Hirsch v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1963); Brooks v. Commissioner,
CODE

274 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1959); Rowe B. Metcalf, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1402 (1963).
63.

Hirsch v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1963).

64. Lamont v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1964).
65. Dupont v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 681 (D.C. Del. 1964); Norman C. Demler,
25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 620 (1966).
66. Treas. Reg. §1.1371-1 (g) (1959).

67. Treas. Reg. §1.1371-1 (e) (1959).
68. Byrne v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1966); AV. C. Gamman, 46 T.C. I
(1966).
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1.1371-1 (g) it seems that the thrust of the Commissioner's attack is at corporate action, which causes a difference in the voting rights of the shareholders.
This type of corporate action was held to terminate the S election in the
case of Samuel Pollock.69 There the court found that the difference in voting
rights had been created by the corporation and adhered to each share regardless of the owner's desires. On the other hand, with a voting trust or pooling
agreement each share retains identical voting rights as well as all other
rights, and any modification is made solely by the owners of the stock. Since
the corporation has the sole power to create and issue classes of stock, no
mere shareholder agreement, be it formal or informal, should be able to
create preferred stock from common or in any other way alter the rights to
the holder with respect to the corporation.
Since a voting trust is made up of individuals who are already stockholders of the corporation, it would in no way affect the size of income allocation of the corporation, as would stockholding by another corporation, a
partnership or a normal trust.70 In Catalina Homes,7 3 although the court
did not directly reach the voting trust question, it did admit to uncertainty as
to whether the regulations represented a proper interpretation of the statute. The court found that the congressional purpose of simplifying the determination of who is to receive corporate income distributions would not
be hindered by shareholders' arrangements of this nature. In Fulk & Needham, Inc. v. United States,72 the district court interjected "tax substance" as
being a controlling factor in determining whether a trust has become a shareholder. In so doing the court declared regulation 1.1371-1 (e) and Revenue
74
Ruling 63-22673 invalid to the extent that they required a different result.
Nowhere in the Code is there a provision that treats a voting trust as a separate entity capable of holding stock or being subject to taxation.
With this in mind, one should consider regulation 1.1371-1 (d) (1), which
states that persons "who would have to include in gross income dividends
distributed with respect to their stock" will generally be deemed to be stockholders of a corporation. For example, when the titular owner of stock under
state law holds it solely as security for an obligation of the beneficial owner,
the latter will still be held to be the shareholder for Subchapter S purposes.7 5
Also, even though title to a decedent's property may pass directly to the
devisees on the owner's death, if the property is subject to administration
and possession by the personal representative, the estate is the shareholder
during the period of administration.Jr Special care should be taken that the
administration of the estate is not unduly prolonged, thereby enabling the
69. 45 T.C. 92 (1966).
70. Old Virginia Brick Co. v. Commissioner, 367 F.2d 276 (4th Cir. 1966).
71. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1361 (1964).
72. 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9517 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
73. 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 341.
74. United States v. De Bonchamps, 278 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1960); A & N Furniture &
Appliance Co. v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 40 (D.C. Ohio 1967).
75. Alfred N. Hoffman, 47 T.C. 218 (1966), afJ'd, 391 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1968).
76. Rev. Rul. 61-116, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 207.
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Commissioner to assert that the estate has terminated and that a testamentary
trust has come into existence. 77 Under this line of reasoning it is unlikely that
a "voting trust" established by the shareholders would cause a termination
of an S election. The trust itself has no "tax substance" and all the income
will be taxed to the shareholders of record. Any other holding would be
allowing mere form to control over the actual substance of the relationship.
NONLIQUIDATING DISTRIBUTIONS

The taxation of distributions made by a tax option corporation is determined under the general distribution sections of Subchapter C rs unless
contrary or modifying provisions are contained in Subchapter S.79 This section will compare and contrast the tax treatment of nonliquidating distributions of both Subchapter S and Subchapter C corporations.
Cash Distributions
All distributions of money by a C corporation are treated as dividends
to the extent of current or accumulated earnings and profits (E & P) .80 These
cash distributions serve to reduce E & P and are deemed to have come from
1
the most recently accumulated E & P.s
Such distributions are fully taxable
as ordinary income to the recipient shareholders although an annual 100
dollar dividend exclusion is provided as relief (although token at best) from
the burden of double taxation. 82 If the cash distributed exceeds current and
accumulated E & P, the shareholder's basis will be reduced to the extent of
such excess, but not below "0."8 3 Any further excess will be treated as re-

ceived in a sale or exchange of the stock unless such distribution is within
the ambit of section 341 (a) (3).14

The rules governing cash distributions by C corporations also apply to
S corporations but with several modifications. Section 1377 (b) of Subchapter
S states that current E & P of an S corporation will not be reduced by any
item that is not allowable as a deduction in computing taxable income as
defined in section 1373 (d). Since cash dividends are not deductible in computing taxable income, current E & P of an S corporation will therefore not
be reduced by cash distributions. This, of course, is contrary to the result
under section 312 (a) for C corporations. However, cash distributions during
the year will reduce E & P accumulated at the end of the year. The ostensibly
different effect of cash distributions on E 8: P resulting from the operation of
section 1377 (b) is, as a practical matter, misleading. Section 312 (a) (1) re77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Old Virginia Brick Co. v. Commissioner, 367 F.2d 276 (4th Cir. 1966).
CODE §§301-395.
Treas. Reg. §1.372-1 (c) (1959).
CODE §316(a).
Id.
CODE §116.

Meyer v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1381 (1946); CODE §301 (c) (2); Treas. Reg. §1.1377-

2 (a) (2) ex. 2 (1959).
84. CODE §301 (c) (3) (A).
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quires that E & P be reduced by the amount of money distributed, but section
316 (a) (2), which defines dividends, requires that distributions first reduce
current E & P and, secondly, that current E & P be computed "as of the
close of the taxable year without diminution by reason of any distributions
made during the taxable year ....
It is apparent that the dividend status of
cash distributions for both C and S corporations, insofar as current E 8CP is
concerned, will be determined by the extent of current E 8CP accumulated at
the end of the year. There is only one practical effect resulting from section
1377 (b) of Subchapter S that differs from Subchapter C. It is possible under
Subchapter C to have taxable income exceed current E & P, with the result
that a distribution of all the taxable income of the current year (an unlikely
event) would not be fully subject to the second tax at the shareholder level,
assuming no accumulated E & P existed at the time (an equally unlikely
event in a C corporation setting).85 Under Subsection S, it is impossible for
taxable income to exceed current E & P since section 1377 states that current
E & P will not be reduced by any deduction not also allowable as a deduction
from section 1373 taxable income. However, this is not particularly important
and has little practical significance. The actual purpose of section 1377 (b),
which will become more apparent in the discussion of undistributed taxable
income below, is to prevent the taxable income of an S corporation from
escaping the single tax imposed by Subchapter S at the shareholder level.
Subchapter S introduces another slight deviation from the section 312 and
section 316 treatment of E & P on cash distributions. Regulation 1.1373-1 (e)
creates a "three tier" structure, somewhat analogous to the tier structure of
Subchapter J (taxation of estates and trusts), for the purposes of allocating
E & P. Under this structure, cash distributions are in the first tier, with
the consequence that E & P is first allocated to cash distributions. If any
E & P remains, it is allocated to the second tier (UTI and property distributions), with any further excess allocated to the last tier (distributions in
exchange for stock). No such tier discrimination exists under Subchapter C.
Another modification with regard to cash distributions under S pertains
to distributions within two and one-half months after the close of the taxable
year. Such cash distributions are deemed to be distributions of undistributed
taxable income (UTI) of the prior year to the extent of such person's share
of UTI for the year. 6 These distributions are not dividends and do not
reduce either current or accumulated E & P pursuant to section 1375 (f). A
companion section to section 1375 (f), section 1375 (d), provides that cash
distributions s7 in excess of current E & P will be considered distributions of
the previously taxed undistributed taxable income (PTUTI) of all prior
S election years.88 This section eliminates only the dividend status that would
85. As an example, E & P would be reduced by federal income taxes paid, but taxable

income would not.
86. CODE §375(f) (1).
87. CODE §1375 (d) does not limit its applicability to cash distributions in the body of
the statute. However, Treas. Reg. §1.1375-4(b) (1968) imposes a cash distribution limitation
on its application.

88. By contrast, CODE §1375 (f) applies only to the immediately preceding year.
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have arisen due to the existence of accumulated E & P. If any current E & P
exists, section 1375 (d) will not become operative.
A further distinction in the treatment of cash distributions under Subchapters C and S lies in the availability of the section 116 dividend exclusion.
Section 116 was enacted to relieve the shareholder of the burden of double
taxation on corporate earnings. Section 1375 (b) understandably denies the
shareholder of an S corporation the benefit of the section 116 exclusion on
dividends from current E & P since Subchapter S income is not subjected to
the double tax.8 9 However, since section 1375 (b) denies the section 116 exclusion to dividends from current E & P only, presumably section 116 would
be available to dividends from accumulated E Q<P. Section 1375 (b) likewise
provides that the section 37 retirement income credit will not be available to
the shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation.
A final distinction lies in the characterization of the income recognized
by shareholders of C and S corporations on cash dividends. In C corporations,
cash distributions from E & P are taxed as ordinary income. This, however,
is not always the case in S corporations, and herein lies one of the unique and
most desirable features of the Subchapter S corporation. Under Subchapter S,
amounts distributed as dividends will be characterized as long-term capital
gain to the extent of the current E &.P, and to the extent of the individual
shareholder's prorata share of the excess of net long-term capital gain over
short-term capital loss. 90 Subchapter S thus effects a "pass-through" of longterm capital gain to its shareholders that results in a tax savings to them. 91
The determination of capital gains, particularly in regard to sales or exchanges of section 1231 assets, is made at the corporate level (but see regulation 1.1375-1 (d)). The Subchapter S pass-through does not, however, extend to capital losses.92 The presence of a capital gain pass-through in S
corporations led to numerous abuses through "one-shot" elections whereby
taxpayers who were contemplating a sale of assets involving large capital
gains would elect under Subchapter S in order to have the proceeds of the
sale subject to only one tax at capital gains rates. After the sale, the corporation would distribute the proceeds and terminate the S election. 9 3 Congress sought to remedy this situation by passing section 1378, which imposed
a penalty tax on an S corporation if the net long-term capital gain over the
short-term capital loss in any one year exceeded 25,000 dollars, and exceeded
fifty per cent of the taxable income, and if the taxable income of the corpo-

89. CODE §1372 (b). However, the penalty tax of §1378 may apply.
90. CODE §1375 (a), as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, §301 (b) (11). For purposes of the long-term capital gain pass-through the excess of net long-term gain over
short-term capital gain cannot exceed the corporation's taxable income for the year. CODE
§ 1375 (a) (1).
91. See CODE §§1201 (b), 1202 for the applicable long-term capital gain rates.
92. CODE §1375 (a) deals only with capital gains. Since no provision of Subchapter S
treates capital losses, presumably such losses would be covered by CODE §1211.
93. B. BITrKER & J. EusTiCE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 272 (1966) [hereinafter cited as BITTKER & EusTicE]. The tax-free distribution could

be accomplished under

CODE

§1375 (f).
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ration exceeded 25,000 dollars for the year. However, it is submitted that
Congress fell somewhat short in its endeavor to prevent the one-shot election
in that S corporation status still often produces less of a tax burden to the
shareholders, even with the penalty tax of section 1378, than if the sale had
been carried out by a C corporation. Moreover, the tax paid at the corporate level under section 1378 serves to reduce UTI by the amount of the
tax paid, thereby reducing the amount of the shareholder's taxable income
and thus avoiding a complete double taxation. In addition, the exceptions
to the section 1378 tax provided in section 1378(c) further reduce the
effectiveness of this section. The flexibility for manipulation under section
1378 (c) is evident when it is realized that the corporation could keep longterm capital gain below 25,000 dollars (or below fifty per cent) by electing
to report gain under the installment method (section 453). If continued for
three years the corporation would no longer be eligible for the application
of section 1378.
The capital gains pass-through under Subchapter S also might provide
the taxpayer with an instrument to circumvent the collapsible corporation
provisions of Subchapter C.9 4 The use of C corporations for this purpose will
be discussed below.
Undistributed Taxable Income
The concept of undistributed taxable income (UTI), as it exists under
Subchapter S, has no counterpart in Subchapter C. The purpose of UTI is
somewhat akin to the tax treatment of partnerships under Subchapter K in
that both are designed to directly tax the shareholders (or partners) on all
taxable income produced during the year. 95 However, any similarity between
Subchapter S and Subchapter K ends, for the most part, at this point. Section
1378 (a) requires that the UTI of an S corporation be included in the gross
income of the shareholders. Section 1373 (b) effectuates the policy statement in
section 1373 (a) by adopting a Subchapter C dividend concept rather than
the Subchapter K conduit approach. Under section 1373 (b) every shareholder
of an S corporation who is a shareholder on the last day of the taxable year
is deemed to have received a dividend equal in amount to his prorata share
of the corporation's UTI for the year. This amount will be taxed to the
shareholders as ordinary income to the extent that it is treated as a distribution out of current E Sc P. Section 1873 (c) defines UTI as being the taxable
income of the corporation minus: (1) any taxes imposed on the corporation
under sections 1378 and 56, and (2) any money distributions made during
the year. The UTI dividend, like the cash distribution, is a modified version
of the Subchapter C dividend. Current E 8e P, as has already been established,
is not reduced by a UTI dividend.9 6 Also, under the tier structure established
by the regulations for the allocation of E & P,97 UTI dividends share a second
94. See CODE §341.
95. See CODE §§701-771.
96. CODE §1377 (b).
97. Treas. Reg. §1.1373-1 (e) (1959).
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priority with property distributions. Consequently, current E & P will only
be allocated to UTI distributions to the extent that it exceeds distributions
of cash (unless such cash distributions fall under section 1375 (f)). The effect
of distributions of property on the allocation of E c P to UTI will be
explored below.
The major distinction between the UTI dividend and a dividend under
Subchapter C lies in the fact that UTI is not an actual distribution of cash
or property as is required under Subchapter C.98 A UTI dividend is treated
as though it were a distribution to the shareholders who, in turn, are deemed
to have reinvested it in the corporation as a capital contribution. Just as an
actual capital contribution increases the shareholder's basis in his stock, section 1376 (a) requires a corresponding increase in basis for a UTI dividend.
The constructive UTI distribution is determined by the taxable income of
the corporation, which is computed in the same manner as if it were a C
corporation except for the following: (1) no deduction for net operating loss
is allowed and (2) the deductions under sections 241-247 (relating to special
deductions for corporations) are also disallowed. 99 In relation to the computation of taxable income, a number of problems that often arise in a C corporation setting also arise under Subchapter S, but in a somewhat modified
form. One area of frequent litigation for C corporations arises under the
"reasonable salary" provision of section 162 (a) (1). The double tax imposed
on C corporations offers substantial inducement for shareholder-employees
to fix excessive salaries for themselves in order to both lower corporate taxable income and to facilitate a direct distribution of earnings to themselves
while avoiding the second dividend tax bite. The Commissioner usually
attacks these salary deductions on the ground that they are not reasonable
in iight of the services rendered.100 The problem of salary deductions arises in
reverse under Subchapter S. Since an S election eliminates the double taxation
of corporate earnings, the incentive to have excessively high salaries does not
exist. However, shareholder-employees of S corporations frequently attempt
to set excessively low salaries for themselves and couple this with a dispersal
of their stock to members of their families in an attempt to "climb down
the surtax ladder." This, of course, is accomplished through the reallocation
of UTI or cash dividends among family members who are in lower tax
brackets. Here again the Commissioner has ample grounds to attack such
a maneuvering of taxable income. The "reasonable salary" argument used
by the Service against C corporations was also successfully utilized to attack
unreasonably small salary deductions in S corporations in one recent case.101
Moreover, Subchapter S itself provides the Commissioner with an effective
weapon in section 1375 (c). This section provides that dividends from S cor98. See CODE §§-316, 317 (a).
99. CODE §1373 (d). The reasons for the disallowance of net operating loss deductions
will be explained infra. The deductions under CODE §§241-247 are basically designed to
relieve the bite of double taxation on the corporation and, hence, are inapplicable.
100. See CODE §162 (a)(1). See also Miller Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 421 (4th
Cir. 1945).
101. Roob v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 891 (1968).
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porations may be apportioned or reallocated among shareholders who are
members of the same family in order to reflect the value of services rendered
to the corporation by such shareholders. The Regulations sound an ominous
warning of the Commissioner's intent to utilize this section by stating that
all transactions among members of a family (for example, stock transfers by
the shareholder employee to his wife and children) will be closely scrutinized.
Section 1375 (c) was successfully applied by the commissioner in the recent
case of Krahenbuhl v. Commissioner.-°2 In Krahenbuhl, the taxpayer and
his wife, who together owned all the outstanding shares of the corporation,
transferred blocks of shares to their children. The court invoked section
1375 (c) to allocate taxable income to the taxpayer on the grounds that the
salary deductions taken did not accurately reflect the value of his services.
03
A third alternative is the invocation of the assignment of income doctrine.
In Duarte v. Commissioner0 4 the taxpayer transferred twenty-five per cent
stock interests to his two sons (ages eight and fifteen years) in conjunction
with a "surprise move" of the board of directors that almost simultaneously
voted to reduce his salary from 80,000 dollars to 15,600 dollars per year.
Although mentioning section 1375 (c), the court in Duarte appeared to rely principally on assignment of income, form versus substance, and other
common law of taxation doctrines to reallocate taxable income to the taxpayer. If Duarte is any indication, the Commissioner has a broad arsenal
from which to draw in combating any attempts by shareholders of S corporations to evade taxes via manipulations of salary deductions.
One further question should be raised at this point. In attempting to
bolster the Commissioner's position, the Regulations state that a donee of
stock in an S corporation will not be considered as a shareholder unless such
stock was acquired in a "bona fide transaction" and such donee is the true
owner of the stock. 10 5 This regulation therefore raises some doubts as to
whether any gratuitous transfer of stock can be effectuated in a family setting.
The result, of course, will depend on what interpretation is placed upon a
"bona fide transaction." It is submitted that intra-family conveyances should
be upheld so long as all employees are adequately compensated and the
donees exercise effective control over the stock. Such an interpretation would
effectively eliminate the flagrant abuses of the statute while still upholding
the corporate concept of Subchapter S.
LoCKED-IN EARNINGS

The UTI constructive dividend creates an unusual and often hazardous
situation in S corporations that, paradoxically, is accepted as the "way of
life" under Subchapter C. The problem lies in the area of double taxation

102. 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 155 (1968).
103. See Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122
(1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
104. 44 T.C. 193 (1965).
105. Treas. Reg. §1.1373-1 (a) (2) (1959).
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of corporate earnings. Under Subchapter C, taxable income is taxed first to
the corporationlo6 and then again to the shareholders as it is distributed in
the form of taxable dividends. 107 One of the primary reasons for the adoption
of Subchapter S was the elimination of the double taxation of corporate
earnings and the substitution of a single direct tax on corporate income to
the shareholders.10s If taxable income is not actually distributed but is taxed
to the shareholders by way of the constructive UTI dividend, 109 the earnings
are retained by the corporation and the shareholder is faced with the
problem of reclaiming his previously taxed undistributed taxable income
(PTUTI) from the corporation without paying a second tax on the distribution.11 As was pointed out above, Subchapter S provides two means by
which this tax free reclamation may be carried out. Section 1375 (f) insures
that all cash distributions made on or before the 15th day of the third month
following the close of the taxable year will be deemed a distribution of the
prior year's PTUTI (to the extent of the recipient's share of PTUTI), even
if the corporation has lost its S status at the time of the distribution, provided that the corporation was an S corporation in the immediately preceding
year. Section 1375 (d) produces the same result but is limited in application
to instances in which no current E &-P exists and the corporation must be
an S corporation at the time of the distribution. If, however, the S election
is terminated after the two and one-half month grace period provided by
section 1375 (f), which may occur quite unexpectedly due to the Commissioner's strict enforcement of the section 1372 (e) termination provisions,"'1 neither section 1375 (f) nor section 1375 (d) will be available. The result of this
undesirable situation is that the PTUTI is "locked-in" and the shareholders
will probably be forced to pay a considerable amount of tax to reclaim it.
Some commentators believe, however, that the concept of locked in PTUTI
is a fiction.112 They premise their argument upon the generally accepted
theory that UTI (and PTUTI) is first distributed to the shareholders and
then recontributed by them in the form of a capital contribution. They
reason that PTUTI is, therefore, nothing more than capital that is privileged over other forms of capital in that it may be distributed out of the
corporation tax-free via sections 1375 (d) and 1375 (f).13 The locked-in conSee CODE §§11, 1201 (a), 531.
107. See CODE §§301, 316, 312.
106.
108.

CODE

§1372(b).

109. See CODE §1373.
110. As has already been pointed out, a cash distribution from an S corporation will
fall under CODE §§301, 311, 312 and will be treated as a dividend unless §1375(o or
§1375(d) applies. But see CODE §1377 in regard to the application of §312.
111. See, e.g., Old Virginia Brick Co. v. Commissioner, 367 F.2d 276 (4th Cir. 1966).
112. Note, Locked-In Earnings-How Serious a Problem Under Subchapter S?, 49 VA.

L. REV. 1516 (1963).
113. The tax-free nature of CODE §1375 (0, (d) distributions only extends to the
shareholder's pro rata share of PTUTI. In addition, if such a distribution exceeds the
shareholder's basis it will be treated under §301 (c) (3) (A) as being received in a sale or
exchange of the stock. See Treas. Reg. §1.1375-4(a) (1959); e.g., Treas. Reg. §1.1375-6(a)(1)
(1968).
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cept that these commentators attack conceives of PTUTI becoming lockedin a former S corporation in such a way that the shareholder must receive
taxable dividends in order to get it out."4 This reasoning, according to their
theory, is fallacious since PTUTI is capital and distributions of capital are
never dividends. 1 They conclude that, in the sense that PTUTI is lockedin due to the necessity of a dividend distribution to reclaim it, there is no
such tax concept as locked-in earnings. The only effect a true distribution of
PTUTI will have, according to their theory, is to reduce basis under section
801 (c) (2) and produce capital gain under section 301 (c) (3) (A).
The observation as to the capital status of PTUTI is correct, and insofar
as the above-mentioned theory attacks the dividend status of post-termination
(and non-section 1375 (f)) distributions, it also appears to be correct. However,
for all practical purposes, PTUTI can become locked-in. The controversy
here is a definitional one - that is: What is "locked-in PTUTI?" It is submitted that, in popular usage, "locked-in" is a practical term meaning that
PTUTI is not readily accessible without suffering an additional tax burden
to redeem it. Even though PTUTI is capital and distributions of capital
can never be dividends, it is small comfort to a client-shareholder of a former
S corporation to tell him that his PTUTI is not really locked-in, and that
if the corporation will only distribute all of its current and accumulated
E 9 P, then he can receive his PTUTI under section 301 (c) (2) and section
301 (c) (3) (A). This is, at the very least, impractical and probably impossible
from the standpoint of corporate liquidity. The additional tax burdenprobably of mammoth proportions - generated by the distributions of current and accumulated E & P, which paved the way for the PTUTI distributions, must also be considered. Consequently, as a practical matter, it is
apparent that PTUTI may well become locked-in." 6
One final problem might arise in PTUTI distributions under the collapsible corporation provisions of Subchapter C."1 If distributions under section
1375 (d) or section 1375 (f) exceed the shareholder's basis in his stock, the
remaining portion of the distribution is treated under section 301 (c) (3) (A)
as being received in exchange for the stock." s If the corporation is "collapsible" under section 341 (b), such distributions will be transformed into
ordinary income under section 341 (a) (3). This would probably be a most unexpected occurrence considering the intended nature of the distribution.
However, income averaging under section 1301 might be available to ease
some of the burden.

114. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §1.1375-4(a) (1959) referring to nondividend and dividend
treatment.
115.

CODE §801 (c) (2), (c) (3); Treas. Reg. §1.316-2 (a) (1955).

116. There is one minor consolation to the stockholder. His basis would be increased
under §1376 (a) by the amount of PTUTI. Assuming the corporation experienced no net
operating losses that would reduce basis under §1376(b), any profit on a subsequent sale
of the stock would be correspondingly reduced by the increase in basis.
117. CODE §341.
___
118. 48 T.C. 666 (1967), afJ'd, 398 F.2d $40 (4th Cir. 1968),
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DISTRIBUTIONS OF PROPERTY

The treatment of property distributions under Subchapters S and C
differs in several respects. The contrast is immediately apparent upon comparing the Subchapter S definition of "property" with that of Subchapter C.
Under section 317 (a), property includes money, securities, and any other
property except stock in the distributing corporation. Under Subchapter S,
however, money is not treated as property, 1" 9 but receives special treatment
under section 1373. However, this is the only difference in what is encompassed by the term "property" and, presumably, the case law under Subchapter C pertaining to what constitutes property would also be applicable to
Subchapter S corporations insofar as money distributions are not involved.,'2"
Under Subchapter C, property distributions are treated as dividends to
the extent fair market value is covered by E & p.121 However, due to the
tier structure allocation of E Sc P under Subchapter S, property dividends
do not enjoy the equal priority with cash distributions that exists under
Subchapter C. The Regulations under section 1373 call for the allocation of
E & P first to any cash distributions, with any remaining E &c P allocated
12 2
ratably between the constructive UTI dividend and property distributions.
For the purposes of determining the ratable shares of E & P, the fair market
value of the property rather than its basis is used.12 3 This produces an unintended distortion due to the application of section 312 (of Subchapter C)
that controls the effect of property distributions on E & P to the extent not inconsistent with the tier structure of section 1373. This distortion is caused
by the requirement of section 312 (a) (3) that E & P be reduced by the adjusted basis of the property distributed. Consequently, it is possible to create
accumulated E & P through a property distribution under Subchapter S. This
possibility is illustrated in the following example:14
An S corporation has current E & P of $50,000 and no accumulated
E & P. The UTI for the taxable year is $50,000, and the corporation
made a distribution of property with a fair market value of $50,000
and an adjusted basis of $10,000. The shareholders cannot be taxed on
more than $50,000.125 Under the Regulations, E & P would be allocated
(50,000/100,000 x 50,000 E & P)
$25,000 to UTI and an equal
amount (50,000/100,000 x 50,000 - 25,000) to property. E & P is
119. See Treas. Reg. §1.1373-1 (d), (e) (1969), which refers to "property other than
money."
120. See, e.g., United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964); Rev. Rul. 64-56,
1964-1 Cum. BULL. 133.
121. Treas. Reg. §1.316-1 (a) (3) (1962). But see Commissioner v. Godley's Estate, 213
F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Hirshon Trust, 213 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1954).
122. Treas. Reg. §1.1373-1 (e) (1959). It should be pointed out that a third tier exists
if any E & P remains after allocation to the first two tiers.
123. Treas. Reg. §1.1373-1 (g) ex. 3 (1959).
124. Example taken from an address by Professor J. J. Freeland entitled "Application
of General Corporate and Other General Tax Provisions of Subchapter S Corporations and
Shareholders," 1968 University of Iowa Tax Institute.
125. CODE §§316, 301 (c).
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then reduced by the $25,000 UTI deemed distributed, 126 but (and
herein lies the distortion) E & P is only reduced by the $10,000 adjusted basis of the property distributed. 127 This creates $15,000 of accumulated E &cP.
This is one of the rare instances in which accumulated E & P can be created
under Subchapter S. This "distortion" would be nonexistent under Subchapter C if, instead of UTI, a 50,000 dollar cash distribution were made in
conjunction with a distribution of the same property. 28 In such a case, all
E & P would be exhausted leaving an "0" basis in the accumulated E & P
account.
One problem that has plagued taxmen for years in regard to property
distributions under Subchapter C might very well extend to Subchapter S
corporations. This is the so-called "Godley-Hirshon" area, named after two
well-known cases decided under the 1939 Code. 29 The problem in this area
stems from the fact that shareholders are taxed on property dividends to
the extent of the fair market value of the property received, while E & P is
reduced by the adjusted basis of the property. If property is distributed
with a fair market value of 100 and a basis of 50, and E c P is 50, to what
extent has the shareholder received a dividend? The Godley and Hirshon
cases held that so long as E & P was sufficient to cover the adjusted basis,
the shareholder would be deemed to have received a dividend equal in
amount to the full fair market value of the property distributed. Consequently, in the example above, the shareholder would be taxed on a dividend
of 100 when E & P was only 50. However, the Regulations under the 1954
Code specifically state that distributions of property will be taxed as dividends to the extent that fair market value is covered by E & P."30 Although
it is conceivable that a Godley-Hirshon interpretation could be placed on the
present statute, in light of the position of the Regulations it is doubtful that
this problem will arise in either Subchapter C or S today.
It should also be noted that one distinction that existed between Subchapter C and Subchapter S treatments of cash distributions does not exist in
property distributions. It will be remembered that cash distributions may be
nondividend distributions under Subchapter S due to sections 1375 (d) and
1375 (f). Section 1375 (f) specifically provides that a property distribution
would not qualify as a return of PTUTI under its provisions. Although
section 1375 (d) does not expressly contain such a provision, the Regulations'
interpretation is such that it also excludes property distributions."'1
126.

CODE §1377 (a).

127. CODE §312 (a) (3).
128. Although the Code and Regulations under §§316 and 312 are not clear on this
point, it is generally agreed that E & P would be allocated ratably between cash and
property distributions. Likewise, the ratable allocation would probably be based on the
& EusTicE, supra note 93, at 192.
adjusted basis of the property. See BiTrmrn
129. Commissioner v. Godley's Estate, 213 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1954); Commissioner v.
Hirshon Trust, 213 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1954).
130. Treas. Reg. §1.316-1 (a) (3) (1962). See also Harry H. Cloutier, 24 T.C. 1006 (1955).

131. Treas. Reg. §1.1375-4 (b) (1959).
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STOCK DISTRIBUTIONS

Section 305 (a) excludes from income distributions of stock made by a
corporation with respect to the stock of the corporation. This section would
also apply to a Subchapter S corporation with the exception of section
305 (b) (1), which deals with stock distributions in discharge of preference
dividends. 1 3 2- However, it appears certain that in the near future section 305
will be modified by Congress so that stock distributions in conjunction with
taxable dividends on other stock will be taxable income to the extent that
the distribution increases the shareholder's proportionate interest in the
corporation. This change will apply to Subchapter S as well as to Subchapter
C. One possible caveat under Subchapter S is the possibility that the stock
distributed might be deemed a second class of stock, which would terminate
the S election under section 1372 (e) (3). In order to prevent this occurrence,
care must be taken to insure that the stock issued is identical in respect to
rights and interests in the control, profits, and assets of the corporation.
The Commissioner has been quick to enforce the involuntary termination
measures, and S shareholders must be ever careful to avoid this possibility.
One of the express requirements of section 305 (a) is that the stock be
distributed with respect to the stock of the corporation. Consequently, if
stock is issued to an employee or independent contractor by the corporation as
compensation for his services, it is not in respect to the stock of the corporation and would be taxable income to him. 1 33 This would be true under
both Subchapters C and S. The validity of this point has been contested in a
situation in which a shareholder-employee owning 100 per cent of the stock
of the corporation was issued a "stock dividend" in discharge of the salary
due him by the corporation. The taxpayer argued on the basis of Eisner v.
Macomber,1 one of the most famous cases in the annals of tax history, that
he received nothing of value (since he owned 100 per cent of the stock of
the corporation before and after the distribution) and that he had recognized no gain. Two courts of appeal reached opposite conclusions on this
matter and the dispute has never been resolved.1 35 However, in view of the
recent development of the assignment of income doctrine, it seems clear that
such a distribution would be held to be a taxable dividend today. 13
REDEMPTIONS

Redemption of stock by a corporation, as defined in section 317 (b), is
governed by the provisions of section 302, which treats redemption distributions to shareholders either as sales or exchanges of the stock, or as dividends.
132. Under §1371 (a)(4), Subchapter S corporations may have only one class of stock
that, presumably, would rule out the possibility of preferred stock.
133. Treas. Reg. §1.61-2 (d) (4) (1966).
134. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
135. See Commissioner v. Fender Sales, Inc., 338 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964); Joy Mfg. Co.
v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1956).
136. See Note, Stock Distributions in Discharge of Salary Obligations: Fender Sales
Curbs Taxpayer's Joy, 22 U. FLA. L. Rev. 129 (1969).
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The provisions of section 302 apply to tax option corporations as well as
ordinary corporations. However, due to the unique features of the S corporation, various aspects of redemption take on a different importance under
Subchapter S.
In order for a redemption of stock to be treated as a sale or exchange
under section 302 (a), it must meet one of the three tests set out in section
302 (b).137 Under section 302 (b) (1), a redemption will qualify for sale or
exchange treatment if it is "not essentially equivalent to a dividend." A great
deal of uncertainty shrouds this provision, and it was formerly thought to
apply only to redemption distributions to minority shareholders who had no
control over the corporation.138 However, in Himmel v. Commissioner1 39 a
shareholder who held all of the nonvoting preferred stock of the corporation
in addition to his common stock, gave his shares of common to his son and
the corporation then redeemed all of his preferred stock. This transaction did
not meet either of the other section 302 (b) tests, 140 but the court found the
stockholder's right to share in corporate earnings and in net assets on liquidation was significantly altered. The court held that the net effect of this
transaction was not essentially equivalent to a dividend. The expanded scope
of section 302 (b) (1) might have a special application in a Subchapter S setting. If a shareholder who desires to sell part of his stock in an S corporation,
the sale of which would terminate the S election, 14 has a portion of his
shares redeemed by the corporation, it seems this would be sufficient to
qualify under section 302 (b) (1) as "not essentially equivalent to a dividend."
The "substantially disproportionate distribution" test of section 302 (b) (2)
would certainly apply to Subchapter S and the necessary calculations under
this section would be facilitated by the one class of stock requirement.' 42 The
termination of interest provision of section 302 (b) (3) would also be applicable
to Subchapter S.
At the corporate level, a redemption that qualifies for section 302 (a)
treatment .(the determination of which is made at the shareholder level)
will have last priority for E Sc P allocation under the three tier system of
Subchapter S.143 If E & P is not exhausted in the first two tiers, a section
302 (a) redemption will reduce E Se P in accordance with the rather nebulous
section 312 (e) provision of Subchapter C.24 It should be noted that a dis137. CODE §302 (b) actually contains four "tests" but the fourth, which applies to certain redemptions of stock issued by railroad corporations in reorganizations, is rarely applicable.
138. See Treas Reg. §1.302-2 (1955); Rev. Rul. 56-183, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 161.
139. 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964).
140. CODE §§302(b)(2), (b)(3) both utilize the family attribution rules of §318 and,
hence, the common stock held by his son was attributed to the shareholder and voting
control remained unchanged. The §302 (c) waiver of the family attribution rules with regard
to a §302 (b) (3) termination did not apply.
141. This could occur under §1372(e) if, for example, the shareholder sold stock to
an eleventh shareholder (§1371 (a)(1)) or to a corporation (§1371 (a)(2)).
142. CODE §1371 (a) (4).
143. Treas. Reg. §1.1373-1 (e) (1959).
144. CODE §312(e) provides that the portion of a redemption chargeable to the
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tribution of money that falls under section 302 (a) will not reduce UTI
since section 1373 (c) states that only money distributed as a dividend will
have this effect. Redemption distributions that fail to qualify under section
302 (a) (to the extent of E ge P) receive correspondingly different treatment under Subchapter S. If stock is redeemed for cash under section 302 (d),
it will have first priority for the reduction of E 1 P. The Regulations state
that cash distributions will be in the first tier of E 8, P allocation if they are
not made in exchange for the stock. 14 5 Such a distribution will also reduce
UTI to the extent it is a dividend out of current E Sc p.146 Property distributions, on the other hand, would fall under the second E 8: P tier, with E &cP
being allocated ratably between it and UTI.147 Cash, but not property, distributions under section 302 (d) presumably will qualify for nondividend
treatment under section 1375 (f) or section 1375 (d) since both sections apply
to any money distributions not received in exchange for the stock. 148 If the
corporation has no E & P, a redemption under section 302 (d) would be
preferable to a section 302 (a) redemption since the shareholder would have
no taxable income at all (as opposed to a taxable capital gain under section
302 (a)). In this regard, an additional benefit exists under Subchapter S if
the corporation has no current E & P but does. have accumulated E & p.149
A section 302 (d) cash redemption in such an instance would not be a taxable
dividend under section 1375 (d) to the extent of the shareholder's PTUTI.
This treatment would, of course, not be available under Subchapter C.
Section 303, which treats certain redemptions of stock included in the
gross estate of a decedent as received in exchange for the stock, will apply
to an S corporation. Care should be taken in this situation to insure that
the settlement of the estate is not unduly prolonged or, alternatively, that
the stock is redeemed as early as possible to prevent the Commissioner from
invoking regulation 1.641 (b) -3 to transform the estate into a trust (if a
testamentary trust is provided for in the will) and terminate the S election.150
Section 305 would not be applicable to Subchapter S corporations due to
section 1371 (a) (2), which prohibits a corporation from being a shareholder
in an S corporation. Likewise, section 306 is not applicable to S corporations
because of the one class of stock limitation of section 1371 (a) (4).
One particularly useful aspect of redemptions is evident in the utilization
of a "boot strap" sale of the stock of a corporation. A boot strap sale involves
"capital account" will not be treated as a distribution of E & P. By implication, therefore,
E & P will be reduced by the portion of the distribution not chargeable to the capital
account. For a discussion of the meaning of "capital account" and what portion is chargeable to the capital account, see Edelstein & Korbel, The Impact of Redemptions and
Liquidation Distributions on Earnings and Profits, 20 TAx L. REV. 479 (1965).
145. Treas. Reg. §1.1373-1 (e) (1) (1959) incorporating Treas. Reg. §1.1373-1 (d) (1959).
146. CODE §1373 (c).
147. Treas. Reg. §1.1373-1 (e) (2) (1959).
148. See Treas. Reg. §1.1375-4(b) (1959); Treas. Reg. §1.1375-6(a) (2) (iii) (1968).
149. It is possible for a Subchapter S corporation to have accumulated E & P. The
accumulated E & P may be carried over from its prior Subchapter C years or may have
been created, for example, by the receipt of tax exempt interest by the corporation.
150. See Old Virginia Brick Co. v. Commissioner, 367 F.2d 276 (4th Cir. 1966).
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a conveyance of a portion of the corporate stock, followed by a redemption
by the corporation of the remaining stock. The proceeds of the sale and of
the redemption are treated as having been received in exchange for the stock
and are therefore capital gains (caveat section 341). 151 This enables a purchaser to acquire all the stock of a corporation with a minimum cash investment. This method of disposing of all (or a substantial portion) of the corporate stock would' be equally available to both ordinary and tax option
corporations but only to those with a more than adequate cash position. In
Zenz v. Quinlivan,152 the Commissioner challenged the application of section
302 (a) to a boot strap redemption on the ground that, had the redemption
preceded the sale, it would have been a dividend. It was argued that this
should also be the case where the redemption was prearranged before the
sale. 1 5 3 The court rejected this argument on the grounds that the shareholder
intended to effectuate a complete termination and met the requirements of
section 302 (b) (3). In a subsequent case 154 the court upheld section 302 (a)
treatment even where the redemption preceded the sale on the grounds that
the redemption and sale should be viewed as a single transaction. However,
in Wall v. United States-5 one shareholder purchased a portion of the stock
of another shareholder, obligating himself to purchase the remainder of his
stock in the future. When the purchasing shareholder then caused the corporation to redeem the seller's remaining shares, the purchaser's obligation
was discharged. The court found this to be a constructive dividend to the
purchaser. The Wall limitation on boot strap sales was subsequently narrowed in a later case involving similar circumstances except that the purchaser only obtained an option to buy the remaining shares of the seller.156
The purchasing shareholder then assigned the option to the corporation,
which in turn exercised it by redeeming the seller's shares.
If a boot strap sale is to be used in conveying the stock of an S corporation, it should be arranged in such a manner that will enable the seller to
obtain his share of PTUTI from the corporation. If a shareholder's interest
in the corporation is terminated, he loses his right to reclaim his share of
PTUT1157 unless he was a shareholder at the close of the taxable year and
received a distribution within two and one-half months thereafter under
section 1375 (f). Consequently, if PTUTI is not reclaimed prior to or during
the boot strap sale, it will be lost unless the shareholder can avail himself of
the rather limited section 1375 (f) situation.
One possible means of accomplishing the boot strap sale under Subchapter S while still preserving the right to reclaim PTUTI might involve
a sale coupled with a redemption of all but one share through the issuance
151. The redemption will fall under §302 (a) by virtue of §302 (b) (3).
152. 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).
153. See discussion of Zenz in Bnrirnt & EUSTICE, supra note 93, at 294.
154. United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961).
155. 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947).
156. Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958).
157. Treas. Reg. §1.1375-4(e) (1959). This regulation also states that if the former
shareholder again becomes a shareholder in the future he regains his PTUTI.
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of notes by the corporation. The redemption would probably qualify under
section 302 (b) (2) as substantially disproportionate unless prevented by the
family attribution rules. This method would have the advantage of leaving
cash in the corporation (an otherwise major disadvantage of a boot strap
sale) while at the same time preserving the seller's interest in PTUTI
through the retention of the one share. There are, however, disadvantages to
this method. The possibility that the Commissioner might declare the notes
issued to be a second class of stock should not be lightly dismissed. Such a
determination, if upheld by the court, would terminate the S election. 18
However, in light of several recent cases'1 9 the danger of termination seems
minimal if the notes are proper in every other respect. Another disadvantage
insofar as the seller is concerned is that he must forego the use of a portion of
his sale proceeds. In this regard also, the question must be raised as to
whether the gain on the redemption must be recognized in the year of sale,
or whether he could utilize the installment method under section 453160 and
defer the recognition of his gain to later years. If the redemption is treated
as a separate transaction, section 453 would be available since the proceeds
in the year of sale, exclusive of evidence of indebtedness of the purchaser,
do not exceed thirty per cent of the selling price.161 However, the rationale of
United States v. Carey162 treating a two-step boot strap sale as a single transaction, might be invoked to include the proceeds of the sale in the payments
test of section 453 (b) (2). Since this would probably make section 453 unavailable for the reporting of the gain, the entire gain would then be recognized in the year of sale.163 It should also be noted that the basis in the

one share of stock retained will probably be less than the seller's interest in
PTUTI. Consequently, a portion of any section 1375(f) distribution of
PTUTI will be taxed to the seller-shareholder under section 301 (c) (3) (A),
although probably at long-term capital gains rates.
Another possible alternative would involve having the corporation distribute the seller's share of PTUTI to him under section 1375 (f) prior to
the boot strap sale. This would give the seller full and immediate use not only
of the entire amount of the sale proceeds, but also of his share of PTUTI as
well. This, of course, is even more of a disadvantage to the seller since the
corporate cash account is depleted not only by the redemption but also by
the PTUTI distribution. This would have the effect of obviating any possibility of the boot strap sale in all but the most liquid corporations.

158. CODE §§1372 (e) (3), 1371 (a) (4).
159. See Alfred N. Hoffman, 47 T.C. 218 (1966); August F. Nielsen Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 44 (1968).

160. Although capital gains are involved, the availability of §453 reporting may still
be important to the seller if he has held his stock less than six months or if he is in a
position to utilize the alternate capital gains determination.
161.
162.
163.

See CODE §453 (b) (2).
289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961).
CODE §1001 (b); cf., A. Hovey-King, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 297 (1950); Ennis v.

Commissioner, 17 T.C. 465 (1951).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss3/5

26

Eggerton and Rief: Interelationship of Subchapter S and Subchapter C
SUBCHAPTER S AND SUBCHAPTER C

1970]

PARTIAL LIQUIDATIONS

Under section 831, distributions qualifying as partial liquidations under
section 346 are treated as received in exchange for the stock. Section 346
in turn requires that distributions fall into one of three classifications in order
to receive section 331 treatment: (1) the distribution may be a part of a
64
series of distributions in redemption of all the stock of the corporation,'
(2) the distribution may involve a "corporate contraction, ' 165 or (3) the distribution may be in termination of one of two or more active businesses carried on by the corporation (subject to other requirements in section 346 (b)).
One of the primary applications of partial liquidations to Subchapter S corporations is, again, in the boot strap sale. Under the boot strap sale and
partial liquidation, the seller receives desired assets from the corporation in
redemption of his shares. This device was attacked by the Commissioner on
a theory similar to that advanced by him in the boot strap redemption case
of Zenz v. Quinlivan.166 In Standard Linen Service v. Commissioner67 it was

contended that this was nothing more than a step transaction with the objective of selling the assets of a division of the corporation. The court, however, found this to be a valid corporate contraction. However, the opposite
result was reached by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Idol v. Commissioner 6s in the application of a "form versus substance" test. Consequently,
the validity of this transaction is not without doubt.
Subchapter S provides a possible means to evade some of the pitfalls of
the partial liquidation boot strap sale as they exist under Subchapter C. If
the shareholder who was to receive the assets on the distribution intended to
resell them, the necessity of meeting any corporate contraction test under
section 346 may be obviated by arranging for the corporation to sell the
assets. This will result in a single capital gains tax that, under section
1375 (a), will pass through to the shareholders. The distribution of the proceeds in redemption of the remaining portion of the seller's stock will effectively eliminate the additional E Sc P generated by the sale. 69
NET OPERATING LOSSES

Under the net operating loss provision of Subchapter C, section 172,
small businesses are often unable to take full advantage of losses due to the
lack of earnings during the prescribed three-year carryback and five-year
carryforward periods. 70 One of the unique provisions of Subchapter S has
remedied this situation by providing that net operating losses are passed
directly to the shareholders, thus enabling them to offset any other income
164.
165.
166.

CODE §346 (a) (1).
CODE: §346 (a) (2).
213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).

167. 33 T.C. 1 (1959).
168.
169.
170.

319 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1963).
CODE §1375 (a) applies to cash as well as UTI dividends.
CODE §172 (b) (1). See BrrrKERa - EUSTICE, supra note 93, at 729.
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they might have."' The net operating loss provision of Subchapter S also
lends itself especially to new corporations that expect losses in the formative
172
years and to older corporations that expect nonrecurring losses.
Like section 172, section 1374 of Subchapter S applies only to operating
losses. Capital losses are not passed through and only serve to offset capital
gains at the corporate level. Excess losses presumably may be carried forward
five years under section 1212. Section 1374 is also similar to section 172 (c) in
that it limits net operating loss treatment to allowable deductions. Consequently, for example, hobby deductions would not be deductible.' 7 3 One
significant distinction between section 172 and section 1374 is that E & P of
an S corporation is not affected by any items of gross income or any deductions taken into account in determining net operating losses.'17 The reason
for this provision is obvious when it is remembered that net operating losses
are passed directly to the shareholders.. If E kc P were reduced by net operating losses, the shareholders would receive an unwarranted second benefit
in subsequent years.
It should be noted that net operating losses are limited to the extent of
the shareholder's basis in his stock and any indebtedness owed him by the
corporation.' 5 If the shareholder's prorata share of net operating loss exceeds
this limitation, then the three-year carryback and five-year carryforward of
Subchapter C will apply. However, net operating losses of S corporations may
not be carried over to a nonelection year under section 172 (h), and net
operating losses of nonelection years may not be carried over to election
76
years.1
LIQUIDATION

Now that the formation of, and distributions by, a Subchapter S corporation have been traced, a consideration of the interrelation of the Subchapter C sections relating to termination is in order. The S corporation with
its one tax at the shareholder level presents an opportunity for corporate
liquidation without the need to follow the strict rules set out in sections 333
and 337.
Before examining the advantages and disadvantages of S corporations on
corporate liquidation, consideration should be given to the procedures under
sections 333 and 337. Section 333 permits a "quick" liquidation, provided a
valid election is filed by enough qualified shareholders177 and all of the
transactions involved in the liquidation take place within one calendar
month. 17 Since an S corporation can have only individuals (or their estates)
171.

CODE

§1374.

172. See BITTKER 9: EusTicE, supra note 93, at 729.
173. See DuPont v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 681 (D. Del. 1964); BirrIER &:EusTicE,
supra note 93, at 731.
174. CODE §1377 (c). See Treas. Reg. §1.1377-3 (b) (1959).
175. CODE §1374 (c)(2).
176. CODE §1373 (d) (1).
177. CODE §333 (c).
178. CODE §333 (a) (2).
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as shareholders, the gain, if any, will be determined under section 333 (e). On
liquidation the shareholders' recognized gain is limited to the greater of their
ratable share of earnings and profits or their ratable share of money received
and the fair market value of stocks and securities acquired by the corporation
after December 31, 1953.179 In a section 333 liquidation the corporation's
earnings and profits account is crucial. In the S corporation, because of the
constructive dividend provision,180 there will be little if any accumulated
earnings and profits, so therefore it would be advisable to plan the liquidation for the calendar month immediately following the close of the corporation's taxable year when current earnings and profits are at a minimum.
In this manner not only is one measure of recognized gain reduced, but also
the possibility of the gain being characterized as ordinary income rather
than long-term capital gain' 8' is diminished.
The provisions of section 333 (e) (2) requiring gain to be recognized to
the extent of cash and stock and securities acquired after December 31, 1953,
are easily understood in light of the basis provisions for section 333 liquidations. 82 The recognition of the cash gain cannot be postponed until the
shareholder spends the money since his economic gain has been fully realized.
The rationale is the same with the post-1953 stock and securities because of
.the ready market that exists for them. As with earnings and profits, steps can
be taken to reduce or eliminate these gain producing assets. They can be
used to pay off the corporation's liabilities prior to the liquidation, to purchase assets other than stock (especially assets that the shareholders intended
to purchase anyway), or to distribute selectively the corporate assets. 183
The S corporation will in most cases be troubled only by the cash aspect of
section 333 (e) (2) because of the possible passive investment income problems
presented by interest and dividends. 8 4 The shareholders take a substituted
basis in the assets received, determined by reference to the basis of their
stock exchanged, decreased by the money received and increased by the gain
recognized. 85
The effect to the corporation of the section 333 liquidation is that generally no gain or loss is recognized by the corporation's distribution of assets
in complete liquidation.186 However, the statutory exemptions of section
453 (d) on the disposition of installment obligations and the depreciation recapture provisions of sections 1250 and 1245 do bite in to produce gain.
This presents a problem because the gain recognized can give rise to an
increase in earnings and profits, which in turn will affect the amount of
gain recognized by the shareholders. In a section 333 liquidation the earnings
and profits are irrelevant except to the extent that they determine the amount
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

CODE §333 (e) (1), (2).
CODE §1378 (b), as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, §511 (c) (4).
Treas. Reg. §1.333-4(c) (1955).
CODE §334 (c).
BrrrKsa & EUSTICE, supra note 93, at 359.
CODE §1372(e)(5); Treas. Reg. §1.1372-4(b) (vii), (viii) (1965).
CODE §334 (c).
CODE §336.
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and character of gain recognized by the shareholders. Severe problems may be
present in a section 333 liquidation of a C corporation followed by a sale of
the assets by the shareholders.187 However, with the S corporation's elimination of the tax at the corporate level, the problems in this area and in the
assignment of income area are minimized, unless the character of the gain
would have been different if the property had been sold by the corporation
rather than by the shareholders. The problems presented by the liquidation
of a collapsible corporationss continue to apply, and also section 337 is inapplicable to a section 333 liquidation.1
Consideration should also be
given to the fact that for section 333 to apply, the liquidation must occur
within one calendar month.
Under section 337 there is no gain or loss recognized at the corporate level
on a sale of substantially all the assets of the corporation within twelve
months following adoption of the plan of complete liquidation. 19° The idea
of complete nonrecognition must be modified to properly consider the character of the assets sold by the corporation,191 the concept of assignment of
income, the bites of sections 1245 and 1250,192 and the inability to pass on
preelection installment obligations.1 93 In Williamson v. United States 94 a
cash method corporation with large amounts of uncollected receivables was
liquidated, and the receivables later collected by the taxpayer shareholders.
Here, the corporation had a fixed right to the amounts due and all that remained to be done was collection. Over taxpayer arguments that the cash
method used by the corporation precluded the Commissioner from applying
accrual notions, the court held that even where the "taxpayer does not receive payment in money or property, realization may still occur when the
last step is taken by which he obtains the fruition of the economic gain
that has already accrued to him."1 5 Also, in Commissioner v. Kuckenbergs9
where the corporation sold completed construction contracts on liquidation,
the court ag-eed with the Commissioner that the corporation's method of
accounting should be changed to the accrual method to clearly reflect income realities.
Another drawback to a liquidation under section 337 is the nonavailability in most cases of the installment method of reporting the gain on the
sale of corporate assets. Under section 453 (d)(4) (B) a distribution of such
obligations to the shareholders in a section 337 liquidation constitutes a taxable disposition. Even in those cases where the installment method is
187.
188.
189.
190.

Court Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
CODE §341.
CODe §337 (c) (1) (B).
CODE §337 (a).
191. CODE §337 (b).
192. Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965); West Seattle Nat'l
Bank, 33 T.C. 341 (1959), aff'd, 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961).
193. CODE §453 (d).
194. 292 F.2d 525 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
195. ld. at 526. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Commissioner v. First State
Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948).
196. 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962) (reversing the Tax Court).
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available to the corporation, 197 bunching of income results to the shareholders when the obligations are received in exchange for their stock. The
obligations take a fair market value for the purposes of determining the
shareholder's gain 198 and basis. 99 Some consolation can be taken from the
fact that such bunching will be at capital gains rates.
However, this does not mean that all potentially ordinary income items
are within the scope of the Commissioner's disallowance of the applicability
of section 337. For example, the tax benefit argument has been held inapplicable to an attempted recapture of expense deductions on the sale
of operating assets. In D. B. Anders2 0°0 the court held that the operating
assets - the fruit - was property used in the business clearly within section
337 (b) (1). Even if the items had been inventoried, section 337 (b) (2) would
have applied nonrecognition since the transaction amounted to a bulk sale.
Section 337 was enacted to solve the problems that arose following the
2° 2
Court Holding Co. 2 0 1 and Cumberland Public Service Co. v. United States
decisions by providing the same result whether the corporation sells the
assets and then liquidates or liquidates and then the shareholders sell the
assets. Even if the sale is imputed to the corporation under Court Holding
Co., the gain will go unrecognized under section 337 provided the sale takes
place within the twelve-month timetable. Meeting this twelve-month timetable presents many of the problems of a section 337 liquidation. Connected
with this is the provision of section 337 that disallows losses along with
gains. 20 3 Faced with this problem, the corporation might attempt to straddle
section 337 by selling its loss assets and then adopting the plan of liquidation
and selling the appreciated assets under the shelter of section 337. However,
section 337 applies only to a sale of substantially all the assets of the corporation before the date of adoption (thus recognizing both its gain and its
losses) or after that date (thus subjecting both gains and losses to nonrecognition of section 337). If the corporation splits its sales, the Regulations
provide that "the date of the adoption of the plan of liquidation shall be
determined from all the facts and circumstances." 204 Under this rationale
the Government might assert that the plan had been informally adopted when
the corporation first sold assets at a loss. This predating of the plan may make
section 337 applicable to all sales thereby applying nonrecognition to the
loss, or it may make section 337 totally inapplicable if more than twelve
months have elapsed between the predated plan and the final sale or distribution in liquidation. The Service, however, has not had much success in
205
applying this rationale to corporate straddles.
197. CODE §453 (d) (4) (B) (ii).
198. CODE §331 (a).
199. CODE §334 (a).
200. 48 T.C. 815 (1967).
201. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
202. 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
203. CoDe §337 (a).
204. Treas. Reg. §1.337-2(b) (1955).
205. City Bank of Washington, 38 T.C. 713 (1962); Virginia Ice & Freezing Corp., 30
T.C. 1251 (1958). In Rev. Rul. 57-140, 1957-1 CUM. BuLL. 118, the Service ruled that a
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Another problem presented by both sections 333 and 337 is the requirement of complete liquidation within the specified timetable. The Regulations
modify this by allowing some assets to be retained to meet contingent claims
against the corporation.206 However, the Regulations also state that the term
"claims" does not include amounts due the shareholders with respect to their
stock. 20 7 In order to avoid this stringent requirement, the corporation can
distribute to an escrow agent or trustee the assets needed to satisfy the contingent claims of shareholders or creditors. 2 0 8 It should be noted that all that
is required is a complete liquidation, not a complete dissolution of the corporation. The corporation may be kept alive to protect the corporate name. 20 9
However, care should be taken in any dealing with the corporation or its
distributed assets that it not be construed as a reactivation of the corporation
inconsistent with its claimed liquidation. 0 This problem is avoided with an
S election since the corporation can remain in existence and continue operations while selling its assets subject only to the passive investment income
limitations.211

The S corporation with its one tax at the shareholder level presents an
ideal method for corporate liquidation without having to follow the strict
requirements of sections 333 or 337. As this possibility became more obvious
the Commissioner sought means for avoiding the "one shot election" followed by a sale of the corporate assets and a pass-through of the gain to the
shareholders. The Commissioner first attempted to regulate against the availability of an election to a corporation contemplating liquidation or in the
process of a complete liquidation. 2 However, this attempt was based on
213
rather dubious statutory authority and was dropped prior to final adoption.
In section 1378 the Commissioner has a weapon that can limit the use of "one
shot election" in some cases by restricting the amount of capital gains a
newly elected S corporation can have without the imposition of a surtax.
However, this would appear to be avoidable through careful timing of the
election to meet the three-year requirement, 214 or through use of the installment method with limited payments in the first three years.
The use of Subchapter S also removes any worries as to the time a plan
of liquidation is adopted or the meeting of a fixed timetable. Under S, the
corporation can sell as many or as few assets as it desires at any time it
wishes to do so. Any losses the corporation sustains will be passed through
sale of corporate assets at a loss following the adoption of a plan of complete liquidation
would be accepted only on convincing proof that the earlier sale was not in contemplation
of a later liquidation.
206. Treas. Reg. §1.337-2 (b) (1955).
207. Id.
208 E.g., Rev. Rul. 65-257, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 89; Treas. Reg. §1.337-2 (b) (1955).
209. Rev. Rul. 54-518, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 142.

210. E.g., James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1965); David T. Grubbs, 39 T.C. 42 (1962).
211.
212.
213.

CODE§1372(e)(5).
Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.1372-1 (a) (2), 23 Fed. Reg. 4528 (1958).
Hauptman v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962) (the court held that a

corporation could still elect Subchapter S even though it was in the process of liquidating).
214. CODE § 1378 (c)(1).
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to the shareholders either in the form of net operating losses2 15 or as a reduced UTI distribution.2 16 Another advantage of the S election is that the
asset sales can be made on the installment method with the corporation kept
alive to pass the gain through to the shareholders. With the S corporation's
one tax at the shareholder level there is no need to distribute the obligations
to the shareholders. Therefore, no disposition within the meaning of section
453 (d) occurs. The problem of the section 1378 surtax is present only for
newly elected S corporations'217 and ceases to be of concern in the fourth year
of the payout. A question may arise whether amounts received from installment obligations constituted passive investment income giving rise to a possible termination of the election under section 1372 (e) (5). However, since
these amounts are received from the sale of corporate assets they do not have
the passive investment taint. The only passive income received in the transaction would be the real or imputed 21 s interest on the installment notes. Since
the test for section 1372 (e) (5) is a "gross receipts" test, and since the gross
receipts would include the cash received under the contract, it does not appear that the section 1372 (e) (5) ceiling would be exceeded. As discussed
earlier, an S election prior to liquidation might be advantageous to a potentially collapsible corporation since sections 333 and 337 may be unavailable.

2 19

In some instances the corporation may find that an S election would
produce results less favorable than those available under section 337. For
example, if sale of the corporate assets would produce ordinary income, 220
then section 337 nonrecognition is preferable to the S pass-through of ordinary income to the shareholders. Another situation meriting consideration is
one in which the -shareholder's stock basis is greater than the corporation's
basis for its assets:
A's basis in his X Corporation stock is $300. X Corporation has a basis
of $200 and fair market value (FMV) of $600 in its assets. On the sale
of the assets, X Corporation would realize $400 gain that would be passed
through to A and serve to increase the basis of his stock to $700.21 Upon
a subsequent liquidation X would distribute $600 to A, who would
thereby recognize a $100 capital loss. If the transaction had been under
section 337, A would have recognized $100 on the liquidation of X, the
difference between his stock basis and the FMV of the liquidating distribution.22

215. CODE §1374.
CODE §1373 (b).
217. CODE §1378(a), (b).
218. CODE §483.
216.

219.

CODE §337 (c) (1) (A).

220. Dealer-type property, short-term capital, or business-type assets. Section 337 (b) (2)
provides for nonrecognition on bulk sales of inventory items.
221. CoE §1376(a).
222. CODE§ §331 (a) (1), 334 (a).
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On the other hand, if the corporation's basis for its assets is greater than the
shareholder's stock basis Subchapter S is preferable to section 337:
A has a basis of $100 in his C Corporation stock. X Corporation's assets
have a basis of $200 and a FMV of $400. Under section 337 A would have
a $200 gain on the sale by X Corporation and a $100 capital loss on the
distribution from X of the $400.
In a year during which the liquidating corporation incurs a net operating
loss on ordinary operations, but foresees a gain from the sale of all or part
of its assets, the decision to elect Subchapter S or section 337 depends upon
whether the corporation wants to take advantage of the loss carryback provision (section 337) or whether the corporation considers it more desirable
to pass the loss through to the shareholders (S). However, if S is elected part
of the gain from the sale of the assets will be offset against the net operating
loss, which reduces or eliminates the pass-through to the shareholders. However, this loss pass-through may be preserved if the corporation elects section

337 and S together. Thus, the gain would go unrecognized under section 337
and the loss would pass through undiminished to the shareholders. This
also appears to be a way for the corporation to avoid the section 1378 surtax since the capital gains on the sale of its assets will escape recognition
under section 337. It is suggested that this is too much of a good thing and
that the Commissioner might seek to deny either the S election or the nonrecognition of section 337, arguing that Congress did not intend such double
tax benefit.223 However, this argument seems rather doubtful since there is
2
nothing in the statute expressly prohibiting both elections. 24
SECTION 341 AND SUBCHAPTER S

The collapsible corporation provisions of the Code were added to prevent
individuals from realizing what would normally be ordinary income at
capital gains rates through a sale of stock or the liquidation of the corporation. A classic example of this technique is found in the case of Pat O'Brien.22,
In that case the taxpayer formed a corporation to make a motion picture;
after the picture was completed, but before distribution, the corporation
was liquidated and the movie distributed to the shareholders. The shareholders reported the difference between the cost of their stock and the value
of their proportionate shares in the completed film as long-term capital gain
under section 331 (a). The film took its fair market value basis in their
hands22 against which they could offset receipts from distribution rights. Only

223.

BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 93, at 737.
224. There is nothing in section 337 prohibiting its use by an S corporation. Treas.
Reg. §1.1372-1 (c) specifically provides that to the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of Subchapter S the provisions of Subschapter C shall apply in the same manner
as they would if the election had not been made.
225. 25 T.C. 376 (1955).
226. CODE §334 (a).
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when their basis was exceeded would the shareholders recognize any additional income from the movie. This device was also popular in the real estate
development industry. A corporation would be formed with the shareholder
developers transferring the land to be developed in exchange for tax-free
stock under section 351. The corporation would then develop the land and
build the homes. Upon liquidation, the shareholders would receive their
prorata share of the homes in exchange for their stock. Since the homes
took a fair market value basis on the liquidation, they could be sold without
any further recognition of gain. The only tax paid in these situations would
be on the capital gains realized by the shareholders on the liquidation. A
similar scheme was favorably employed in the liquor industry.
Though the Commissioner has some nonstatutory weapons at his disposal - additional compensation, assignment of income 227 - he has chosen
to attack these maneuvers on statutory authority through the adoption of
section 341. The actual interworkings of section 341 are quite complex and
beyond the scope of this note. However, its basic principle is simple: a shareholder who disposes of his stock in a corporation possessing collapsible assets
in a transaction that would normally give rise to long-term capital gain
must instead report the gain as ordinary income. In effect, the shareholder
realizes his share of the ordinary income lurking in the corporate assets.
However, section 341 applies only if the gain realized on the transaction would
have been long-term capital gain 228 and therefore would not apply to a sale
of stock held for less than six months or to a sale by a dealer in securities.
Since the shareholder cannot sell his stock without realizing the gain
as ordinary income and is unable to liquidate under either section 333229 or
section 837230 Subchapter S provides an interesting method for possibly disposing of collapsible assets at capital gains rates if the taxpayer is ineligible
for the amnesty provisions of section 341 (e). 23" As stated earlier, under the
general scheme of Subchapter S the corporation pays no tax 232 and the taxable income of the corporation is reported pro rata by the shareholders,
whether or not distributed.2 13 While this is generally treated as ordinary income, section 1375 (a) provides for the pass-through of long-term capital gains
flavor to the shareholders.234 Therefore, it appears that in a situation in
which the collapsible corporation qualifies for an S election it can sell the
collapsible assets that are capital or section 1281 assets at the expense of a
227. Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376
(1955).
228. CODE §341 does not apply to short-term gain that can be offset against loss. It
does not apply to losses in general, and does not of itself make the gain taxable and
therefore has no effect on a tax free exchange, e.g., 351 (a).
229. CODE §333 (a).
230. CODE §337 (c) (1) (A).
231. Section 341 (e) is not available if the property would have been dealer property
if held directly by the shareholder.
232. But see CODE §1378.
233. CODE § 1373 (b).
234. Their prorata share of the net long-term gains over the net short-term capital
losses for the taxable year.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1970

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1970], Art. 5

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXII

single capital gain to its shareholders. 23 5 This escape, however, is available
only to transactions that would qualify as a sale of a capital asset.
The Regulations under section 1372 state that the collapsible provisions
are applicable to an S corporation, and therefore the sale of stock in a collapsible S corporation will fall under section 341 (a). However, this result
can be avoided by the corporation selling the collapsible capital or section
1231 asset at the corporate level, with the pass-through of the capital gain236
and an increased stock basis to the shareholders resulting.237 The corporation
would then have the corresponding amount of cash or receivables so that it
could distribute in liquidation or otherwise to the shareholders tax-free.2s
Pat O'Brien Area: X Corporation is formed to make a movie and it
files a timely election under S. The corporation then produces the movie,
but before any amount is realized from its distribution, the corporation
sells the picture for $2 million. This amount will be capital gains to the
corporation and is passed through to the shareholders undei sections
1373 (b) -1375 (a). The corporation will be left with $2 million in cash,
or installment notes if the sale was on the installment method.239 The
shareholder's basis has been increased by this amount and therefore the
corporation can be liquidated without any additional gain on the transaction. Since the installment method recognizes the gain as it is received,
the capital gains will be spread over the payout period. This is not considered to be passive investment income, so the S election will not be
threatened. Since the S election has been in existence from the inception
of the corporation the surtax of section 1378 would not apply.2

40

Even if

the corporation had not elected S in the beginning, section 1378 could be
avoided if the election had been in effect for the three immediately preceeding years.
Real Estate Area: An S corporation could also be used to construct
an apartment building or shopping center. After completion the corporation could sell and pass the capital gains through to the shareholders. Care
would have to be taken to insure that the corporation did not realize
too great an amount of rent from the assets prior to their sale. Since rent
is considered passive investment income, exceeding the twenty per cent
limitation could cause a termination of the election. 24 1 However, the
passive investment taint can be avoided if the corporation provides "substantial services" to its tenants.

24 2

The Regulations state that the "term

235. This is the same result §341 (e) seeks to achieve, but with S the circumstances
are not quite as limited.
236.

CODE §1375 (a).

237.

CODE

§1376(a).

§1375(d), (if).
239. Rev. Rul. 65-292, 1965-2 CuNt. BULL. 319, ruling that if the corporation elected
the installment method of reporting long-term gain, the deferred gain could be ratably
passed through under § 1375 (a).
238.

CODE

240.
241.

CODE
CODE

§1378 (c) (2).
§1372 (e) (5).

242. Treas. Reg. §1.1372-4 (b) (5) (vi) (1959).
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rents does not include payments for the use or occupancy of rooms or
other space where significant services are also rendered to the occupant,
such as for the use of rooms in .. .apartment houses furnishing hotel
services .... Generally, services are considered rendered to the occupant
if they are primarily for his convenience and are other than those usually
or customarily rendered in connection with the rental of rooms or other
space for occupancy only." Such an example is maid service. 243 In the
year of the sale gross receipts would include amounts received on the sale
of the assets, and it is difficult to see how the rents could exceed twenty
per cent of the gross receipts in this situation. Also, all amounts received
as rent would be applied toward meeting the substantial realization
test. Once the latest gain has been substantially realized the corporation
is no longer collapsible.244
In order to prevent this use of the S election the Service proposed two
regulations, 1.1372-1 (a) (2) and 1.1375-1 (d). Under the former, the S election
is available to a corporation in the process of a complete or partial liquidation, or contemplating adoption of such a plan in the near future. This would
apply in the above situations in that a sale by the corporation of a major
asset followed by a distribution to the shareholders might be treated as a
partial liquidation.245 Under regulation 1.1375-1 (d),246 if the electing corporation is availed of by a shareholder or group of shareholders owning a substantial portion of the stock for the purpose of selling assets, which in the
hands of the shareholders would have produced ordinary income, then the
gain on the sale by the corporation will not be treated as capital gain. In
determining the character of the asset sold in the hands of the shareholder,
the activities of other S corporations in which he holds stock will be considered..247 Under this regulation the shareholder-dealer taint could cause
the corporation to have ordinary income rather than capital gain on the
sale of the movie, apartment building, or shopping center. While this regulation, if valid, substantially closes a loophole that exists in the statute, it is
also clear, as has been suggested by many noted authors, 24 8 that the regulation
lacks statutory basis. Since there have been no cases on point, only time will
tell which view the courts will embrace.
This pass-through of capital gains and avoidance of the collapsible provisions is not without its problems when consideration is given to the other
assets of the corporation. If the collapsible asset is sold but there are left
in the corporation noncollapsible assets less than three years old,24 9 does the
corporation still meet the definition in section 341 (b) since the corporation
is dissolved before the realization of a substantial portion of taxable income
243. Max Feingold, 49 T.C. 461 (1968).
244. Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961); CODE §341 (b) (1) (A).
245. CODE §346.
246. Treas. Reg. §1.1375-1 (d) (1959).
247. This became part of the regulations as finally adopted. Treas. Reg. §1.1371-1 (d)
(1968).
248. BrrrKrR & EusricE, supra note 93, at 722 n.34; Bolland, Collapsible Corporations
Under the 1958 Amendments, 17 T'xAs L. REv, 903, 237 (1962).
249. CODE §341 (d) (3).
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from the collapsible asset? Presumably it would not because the income,
although not recognized, has been realized by the corporation, which then
passed it through to the shareholders. It is in this area of "phantom income"
that problems may arise. If this income has not been actually realized for
purposes of the collapsible provisions,250 then the provisions will apply with
full force regardless of the fact that the asset has been sold.
If there are other collapsible assets in the corporation, what is the effect
of this retained cash from the sale of the collapsible assets on the application
of the section 341 (d) (2) seventy per cent test? Because undistributed earnings
included in income of shareholders increase their stock basis, the gain on
the sale of stock or on liquidation would be attributable to the other retained assets if retained cash were ignored. If more than thirty per cent of
the gain were attributable to the collapsible assets, section 341 (a) would
still apply as far as section 341 (d) (2) is concerned. Although this is not
a complete discussion of the relationship of section 341 to Subchapter S it
does present some of the possible advantages of an S election.
MISCELLANEOUS CORPORATE PROVISIONS

Pension and Profit-SharingPlans
Prior to 1970, Subchapter S corporations could avail themselves of the
25
provisions of sections 401-404 and adopt a pension or profit-sharing plan, 1
or both. In the 1969 Tax Reform Act Congress eliminated this option by
limiting shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation to the provisions of
the Keogh Act - restricting contributions from shareholder-employees to
the lesser of 2,500 dollars or ten per cent of income.252 This new provision
may lead many S corporations to terminate their S election where the availability of a pension or profit-sharing plan was a substantial motivating factor
behind the original election.
Section 1244
Individual shareholders of a small business corporation (as defined in
section 1244 (c)) may convert loss on the sale of their stock from capital to
ordinary loss under the provisions of section 1244. Although limited to
25,000 dollars of loss for an individual, and 50,000 dollars for a husband and
wife filing a joint return, this is a great benefit to shareholders who otherwise would have been limited to the very restrictive capital loss provisions
of section 1211. Section 1244 would be available to the shareholders of an S
corporation since there is nothing contained in either section 1244 or Subchapter S that would prevent its application. However, the value of a section

250. Cf. Richardson Foundation v. United States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9341
Tex. (1969).
251. Rev. Rul. 66-218, 1966 CuOM. BULL. 120.
252. CODE §1379 (1) (1) as included in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, §531 (a).
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